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| Vendor: | The SecOps Group |
|---|---|
| Exam Code: | CCPenX-Az |
| Exam Name: | Certified Cloud Pentesting eXpert - Azure |
| Exam Questions: | 31 |
| Last Updated: | August 23, 2026 |
| Related Certifications: | The SecOps Group Pentesting eXpert |
| Exam Tags: |
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You are reviewing Azure Activity Logs after a lab compromise. Which operation indicates that an attacker reset another user's password through Microsoft Entra ID?
A. Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write B. Update user / password profile modification C. Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action D. Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secrets/read
Detailed Solution:
In an Entra ID abuse path, a privileged user such as User Administrator may reset another user's password. In logs, this appears as a user update operation involving the password profile.
Check audit logs in the portal:
Microsoft Entra ID Monitoring Audit logs
Or query via Microsoft Graph/Azure tooling depending on permissions.
The activity to look for is generally:
Update user Modified property: passwordProfile
The other options represent different activities:
Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write = RBAC role assignment change Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action = storage account key retrieval Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secrets/read = Key Vault secret read
Correct answer:
SIMULATION
After gaining access to the Azure tenant, enumerate all resource groups available to the compromised user. One resource group contains the word prod. What is the name of that resource group?
rg-prod-apps-eastus
Detailed Solution:
List accessible resource groups:
az group list --output table
For a cleaner search:
az group list \
--query '[?contains(name, 'prod')].{Name:name,Location:location}' \
--output table
Expected output:
Name Location
-------------------- ----------
rg-prod-apps-eastus eastus
The resource group containing prod is:
rg-prod-apps-eastus
================
SIMULATION
Using the privileges of the previously compromised App Registration, explore the Azure environment to identify and access sensitive information. What is the final flag retrieved from the tenant?
The answer is the final Flag{...} value stored in Azure Key Vault and readable by the compromised App Registration.
Detailed Solution:
Stay authenticated as the service principal from Q10.
az account show
List visible Key Vaults:
az keyvault list --output table
If only one vault is returned, use it directly. If multiple vaults exist, enumerate all of them.
for kv in $(az keyvault list --query '[].name' -o tsv); do
echo '===== $kv ====='
az keyvault secret list \
--vault-name '$kv' \
--output table
done
Once you identify secret names, retrieve their values:
az keyvault secret show \
--vault-name <vault-name> \
--name <secret-name> \
--query value \
--output tsv
To dump all readable secrets from all visible vaults:
for kv in $(az keyvault list --query '[].name' -o tsv); do
echo '===== Vault: $kv ====='
for sec in $(az keyvault secret list --vault-name '$kv' --query '[].name' -o tsv); do
echo '----- Secret: $sec -----'
az keyvault secret show \
--vault-name '$kv' \
--name '$sec' \
--query value \
--output tsv
done
done
Look for the final value in this format:
Flag{...}
That returned secret value is the final tenant flag.
Final Answer:
Use the Flag{...} value returned by az keyvault secret show.
SIMULATION
A compromised developer account has Reader access to a resource group. Enumerate all Azure resources in that resource group and identify the exposed App Service name.
finance-reporting-api
Detailed Solution:
Set the resource group:
RG='rg-prod-apps-eastus'
List resources:
az resource list \
--resource-group '$RG' \
--output table
Expected output:
Name ResourceGroup Location Type
---------------------- --------------------- ---------- -------------------------------
finance-reporting-api rg-prod-apps-eastus eastus Microsoft.Web/sites
prod-reportstore01 rg-prod-apps-eastus eastus Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts
kv-finance-prod rg-prod-apps-eastus eastus Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults
The exposed App Service is:
finance-reporting-api
================
SIMULATION
You discover a storage account named prodreportstore01. Determine whether public blob access is enabled on the storage account.
allowBlobPublicAccess: true
Detailed Solution:
Run:
az storage account show \
--name prodreportstore01 \
--resource-group rg-prod-apps-eastus \
--query '{Name:name,AllowBlobPublicAccess:allowBlobPublicAccess}' \
--output json
Expected output:
{
'Name': 'prodreportstore01',
'AllowBlobPublicAccess': true
}
This means public blob access is enabled at the storage-account level. That does not automatically mean every container is public, but it permits public container/blob exposure if configured.
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