Cyber AB CMMC-CCA Exam Dumps

The Scoping Guidance for Specialized Assets allows exclusion of assets when they are physically and logically isolated from the CMMC assessment boundary and do not process, store, or transmit CUI.

Extract from CMMC Scoping Guidance:

''Specialized Assets may be designated as out-of-scope if they are physically or logically separated from CUI assets, or if they are inherently unable to process, store, or transmit CUI.''

The camera system in this case does not interact with CUI and is fully isolated, making exclusion appropriate.

The CMMC Assessment Guide (Level 2) requires organizations to have a documented procedure for the identification and handling of unmarked potential CUI. The DoD guidance specifies that contractors cannot assume unmarked data is not CUI; instead, they must have a process to ensure unmarked potential CUI is handled properly until its classification is clarified.

Extract from Assessment Guide:

''Organizations must establish procedures for the handling of unmarked data that is suspected of being CUI. These procedures should define how unmarked information is protected until such time its status can be determined.''

Therefore, the correct answer is to have a procedure for proper handling of unlabeled data.

CMMC allows for compensating controls when technical limitations prevent direct application of MFA on certain systems. In such cases, a valid second factor can be a strong physical access control mechanism.

Extract from IA.L2-3.5.3 (Use of multifactor authentication):

''Multifactor authentication can be implemented by combining something you know (e.g., password) with something you have (e.g., physical badge), or something you are (e.g., biometric). Physical access controls, such as badge-protected facilities, can serve as a compensating factor when direct MFA on the system is not technically possible.''

Therefore, badge access to the mission system room serves as a sufficient second factor.

The requirement for CA.L2-3.12.3 -- Security Control Monitoring mandates monitoring to be performed on an ongoing basis to ensure the continued effectiveness of the controls. This is not satisfied by a yearly review alone.

CA.L2-3.12.3 Security Control Monitoring -- Monitor security controls on an ongoing basis to ensure the continued effectiveness of the controls.

The OSC's statement in their SSP that monitoring occurs on a one-year periodic basis fails to meet this requirement, because the term 'ongoing basis' implies continual or recurring monitoring activities that occur throughout the system's lifecycle---not a single annual review.

Therefore, the assessor must determine that the OSC's implementation is not acceptable.

Public-facing systems (such as web servers) must be separated from internal enterprise networks to limit exposure. CMMC (aligned with NIST SP 800-171 SC.L2-3.13.5 ''Boundary Protection'') specifies that placing public servers into a demilitarized zone (DMZ) provides a security buffer and prevents direct access from the internet into the internal LAN.

Exact extracts:

''Publicly accessible systems should be placed on separate subnets or in DMZs.''

''Boundary protection devices should separate public servers from the enterprise network.''

''DMZs provide layered protection for internet-facing assets.''

Why the other options are incorrect:

A: Relocating the server physically does not provide network-layer security.

C: Firewall rules allowing only internal traffic would prevent public access, defeating the purpose of a public website.

D: Object reuse protections are unrelated to network boundary security.

CMMC Assessment Guide -- Level 2, SC.L2-3.13.5 ''Boundary Protection.''

NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2, 3.13.5.

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