Cisco 300-220 Exam Dumps

The correct answer is consistent attacker tradecraft mapped to MITRE ATT&CK. Attribution at a professional level relies on behavioral consistency, not superficial artifacts.

Advanced threat actors routinely rotate infrastructure, recompile malware, and vary filenames specifically to defeat attribution efforts. As a result, indicators such as IP addresses, hashes, and timestamps are unreliable and sit low on the Pyramid of Pain.

What attackers cannot easily change is how they operate. This includes:

Initial access techniques

Credential harvesting methods

Lateral movement patterns

Persistence mechanisms

Command-and-control behaviors

When these behaviors remain consistent across incidents, they form a behavioral fingerprint. Mapping these observations to MITRE ATT&CK techniques allows analysts to compare activity against known threat group profiles maintained by intelligence providers and national CERTs.

Option A and B are weak indicators easily altered by attackers. Option D provides almost no attribution value, as timing alone is coincidental and unreliable.

Professional attribution requires correlating TTPs across campaigns and validating them against historical threat actor intelligence. This method supports high-confidence attribution used in legal, executive, and geopolitical contexts.

Therefore, Option C is the correct and defensible answer.

The correct answer is C. Host 10.201.3.99 is attempting to contact the C2 server to retrieve the payload.

Cisco Secure Network Analytics (Stealthwatch) detects Command-and-Control (C2) activity by analyzing network behavior, not by relying solely on known malicious indicators. In the exhibit, the critical investigative clue is the HTTP payload containing a suspicious external URL, which strongly suggests outbound communication from an internal host to an external command-and-control infrastructure.

The internal IP address 10.201.3.99 belongs to a workstation group (''Desktops''), indicating it is an internal endpoint, not a C2 server. This immediately rules out option B. Instead, the endpoint is acting as a compromised host (zombie) attempting to reach a remote server controlled by an attacker. This outbound beaconing behavior is a classic hallmark of C2 communication.

Option A is incorrect because packet count alone does not confirm C2 activity. C2 traffic is often low-and-slow, intentionally designed to blend in with normal traffic patterns. Option D is also incorrect because the payload does not describe the zombie endpoint; rather, it shows a remote URL, which is likely part of malware staging or command retrieval.

From a threat hunting and SOC perspective, the most valuable information is directionality and intent:

Internal host external suspicious domain

HTTP-based communication over an unusual port

Low data volume consistent with beaconing or payload retrieval

This aligns with MITRE ATT&CK -- Command and Control (TA0011) techniques such as Application Layer Protocols (T1071). Identifying which internal host is reaching out---and why---is essential for containment, endpoint isolation, and scope expansion.

Professionally, this insight enables the analyst to:

Quarantine host 10.201.3.99

Pivot to EDR telemetry on that endpoint

Block the external domain or IP

Hunt for similar beaconing patterns across the environment

In summary, the investigation is aided most by understanding that an internal host is actively communicating with a C2 server, making Option C the correct and operationally meaningful answer.

The correct answer is document findings and create permanent detections. While containment actions are necessary, they are incident response tasks, not threat hunting outcomes.

Cisco's threat hunting lifecycle emphasizes that once malicious behavior is confirmed, teams must:

Document attacker techniques

Identify detection gaps

Convert findings into automated detections

Options A and B are tactical responses that address the current incident but do not prevent recurrence. Option D delays improvement and increases risk.

Operationalizing hunt findings ensures:

Repeated attacker behavior is detected automatically

Future dwell time is reduced

SOC maturity increases

This step directly aligns with the CBRTHD blueprint's focus on continuous improvement and feedback loops between hunting and monitoring.

Therefore, Option C is the correct answer.

The correct answer is behavioral analysis of outbound traffic patterns. Advanced attackers intentionally use standard protocols such as HTTP and HTTPS to blend exfiltration traffic with normal activity.

Hash-based and signature-based methods are ineffective because:

No malware may be present

Traffic appears legitimate

Infrastructure is frequently rotated

Behavioral analysis detects anomalies such as:

Unusual data transfer volumes

Abnormal session timing

Beaconing patterns

Rare destinations

This approach aligns with network threat hunting best practices and forces attackers to significantly alter behavior, increasing adversary cost.

Therefore, option B is correct.

The correct answer is detecting abnormal authentication behavior across VPN and cloud access. This outcome targets behavioral detection, which sits significantly higher on the Pyramid of Pain than static indicators.

Options A and C rely on domains and hashes, which attackers can trivially change. Option D is a response action, not a hunting outcome.

Credential misuse is one of the most common initial access vectors, especially in cloud and remote-access environments. Detecting abnormal authentication behavior---such as:

Impossible travel

Unusual login times

Excessive failed logins

Geographic anomalies

forces attackers to change how they operate, not just what infrastructure they use.

Cisco tools such as:

Secure Network Analytics

Secure Endpoint

Secure Firewall

Identity telemetry via VPN and SSO

enable this higher-fidelity detection approach. This aligns directly with CBRTHD blueprint objectives focused on identity-based threat hunting.

Therefore, Option B is correct.