Arcitura Education S90.20 Exam Dumps

Services A, B and C belong to Service Inventory A .Services D, E and F belong to Service Inventory B .Service C acts as an authentication broker for Service Inventory A .Service F acts as an authentication broker for Service Inventory B .Both of the authentication brokers use Kerberos-based authentication technologies. Upon receiving a request message from a service consumer, Services C and F authenticate the request using a local identity store and then use a separate Ticket Granting Service (not shown) to issue the Kerberos ticket to the service consumer. A recent security audit of the two service inventories revealed that both authentication brokers have been victims of attacks. In Service Inventory A, the attacker has been intercepting and modifying the credential information sent by Service C (the ticket requester) to the Ticket Granting Service. As a result, the requests have been invalidated and incorrectly rejected by the Ticket Granting Service. In Service Inventory B, the attacker has been obtaining service consumer credentials and has used them to request and receive valid tickets from the Ticket Granting Service. The attacker has then used these tickets to enable malicious service consumers to gain access to other services within the service inventory. How can the two service inventory security architectures be improved in order to counter these attacks?

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Service A provides a data access capability that can be used by a variety of service consumers. The database records accessed by Service A are classified as either private or public. There are two types of service consumers that use Service A:

Service consumers with public access permissions (allowed to access only public data records) and service consumers with private access permissions (allowed to access all data records). For performance reasons the Service A architecture uses a single database, named Database A .Each record in Database A is classified as either private or public. After Service A is invoked by a service consumer (1), it authenticates the request message using an identity store and retrieves the corresponding authorization (2, 3). Once authorized, the service consumer's request is submitted to Database A (4), which then returns the requested data (5) If the service consumer has private access permissions, all of the returned data is included in Service A's response message (6). If the service consumer has public access permissions, then Service A first filters the data in order to remove all unauthorized private data records, before sending to the response message to the service consumer (6). An investigation recently detected that private data has been leaked to unauthorized service consumers. An audit of the Service A architecture revealed that Service A's filtering logic is flawed, resulting in situations where private data was accidentally shared with service consumers that only have public access permissions. Further, it was discovered that attackers have been monitoring response messages sent by Service A in order to capture private data. It is subsequently decided to split Database A into two databases:

one containing only private data (the Private Database) and the other containing only public data (the Public Database). What additional changes are necessary to address these security problems?

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Service Consumer A sends a request message with an authentication token to Service A, but before the message reaches Service A, it is intercepted by Service Agent A (1). Service Agent A validates the security credentials and also validates whether the message is compliant with Security Policy A .If either validation fails, Service Agent A rejects the request message and writes an error log to Database A (2A). If both validations succeed, the request message is sent to Service A (2B). Service A retrieves additional data from a legacy system (3) and then submits a request message to Service B Before arriving at Service B, the request message is intercepted by Service Agent B (4) which validates its compliance with Security Policy SIB then Service Agent C (5) which validates its compliance with Security Policy B .If either of these validations fails, an error message is sent back to Service A .that then forwards it to Service Agent A so that it the error can be logged in Database A (2A). If both validations succeed, the request message is sent to Service B (6). Service B subsequently stores the data from the message in Database B (7). Service A and Service Agent A reside in Service Inventory A .Service B and Service Agents B and C reside in Service Inventory B .Security Policy SIB is used by all services that reside in Service Inventory B .Service B can also be invoked by other service consumers from Service Inventory B .Request messages sent by these service consumers must also be compliant with Security Policies SIB and B .Access to the legacy system in Service Inventory A is currently only possible via Service A, which means messages must be validated for compliance with Security Policy A .A new requirement has emerged to allow services from Service Inventory B to access the legacy system via a new perimeter service that will be dedicated to processing request messages from services residing in Service Inventory B .Because the legacy system has no security features, all security processing will need to be carried out by the perimeter service. However, there are parts of Security Policy A that are specific to Service A and do not apply to the legacy system or the perimeter service. Furthermore, response messages sent by the perimeter service to services from Service Inventory B will still need to be validated for compliance to Security Policy B and Security Policy SIB .How can the Policy Centralization pattern be correctly applied without compromising the policy compliance requirements of services in both service inventories?

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Services A, B, and C reside in Service Inventory A and Services D, E, and F reside in Service Inventory B .Service B is an authentication broker that issues WS-Trust based SAML tokens to Services A and C upon receiving security credentials from Services A and C .Service E is an authentication broker that issues WS-Trust based SAML tokens to Services D and F upon receiving security credentials from Services D and E .Service B uses the Service Inventory A identify store to validate the security credentials of Services A and C .Service E uses the Service Inventory B identity store to validate the security credentials of Services D and F .It is decided to use Service E as the sole authentication broker for all services in Service Inventories A and B .Service B is kept as a secondary authentication broker for load balancing purposes. Specifically, it is to be used for situations where authentication requests are expected to be extra time consuming in order to limit the performance burden on Service E .Even though Service B has all the necessary functionality to fulfill this new responsibility, only Service E can issue SAML tokens to other services. How can these architectures be modified to support these new requirements?

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Service A is a publically accessible service that provides free multimedia retrieval capabilities to a range of service consumers. To carry out this functionality, Service A is first invoked by Service Consumer A (1). Based on the nature of the request message received from Service Consumer A, Service A either invokes Service B or Service C .When Service B is invoked by Service A (2A) it retrieves data from publicly available sources (not shown) and responds with the requested data (3A). When Service C is invoked by Service A (2B) it retrieves data from proprietary sources within the IT enterprise (not shown) and responds with the requested data (3B). After receiving a response from Service B or Service C, Service A sends the retrieved data to Service Consumer A (4). Service B does not require service consumers to be authenticated, but Service C does require authentication of service consumers. The service contract for Service A therefore uses WS-Policy alternative policies in order to express the two different authentication requirements to Service Consumer A .When Service Consumer A sends a request message (1), Service A determines whether the request requires the involvement of Service C and then checks to ensure that the necessary security credentials were received as part of the message. If the credentials provided by Service Consumer A are verified. Service A creates a signed SAML assertion and sends it with the request message to Service C (2B) This authentication information is protected by public key encryption However, responses to Service Consumer A's request message (3B, 4) are not encrypted for performance reasons. Recently, the usage of Service C has noticeably declined. An investigation has revealed response messages issued by Service C (3B) have been repeatedly intercepted and accessed by unauthorized and malicious intermediaries. As a result, Service Consumer A has lost confidence in the use of Service A for the retrieval of proprietary data because it is being viewed as a security risk. This is especially troubling, because the owner of Service A had planned to start charging a fee for Service A's ability to provide proprietary data via the use of Service C .How can this service composition architecture be changed to address the security problem with minimal impact on runtime performance?

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