Amazon DOP-C02 Exam Dumps

Step 1: Using Service Control Policies (SCPs) for EC2 SecurityTo limit the use of EC2 instance credentials to the specific EC2 instance they are assigned to, you can create a Service Control Policy (SCP) that verifies specific conditions, such as whether the EC2 instance's source VPC and private IP match expected values.

Action: Create an SCP that checks whether the values of the aws:EC2InstanceSourceVPC and aws:SourceVpc condition keys are the same. Deny access if they are not.

Why: This ensures that credentials cannot be used outside the designated EC2 instance or VPC.

Step 2: Further Validation with Private IPsThe SCP should also verify that the EC2 instance's private IP matches the IP range specified for the VPC. If the instance's private IP does not match, access should be denied.

Action: In the same SCP, check whether the values of the aws:EC2InstanceSourcePrivateIP and aws:VpcSourceIP condition keys are the same. Deny access if they are not.

Why: This ensures that the credentials are only used within the specific EC2 instance and its associated VPC.

This corresponds to Option B: Create an SCP that checks whether the values of the aws:EC2InstanceSourceVPC and aws:SourceVpc condition keys are the same. Deny access if the values are not the same. In the same SCP check, check whether the values of the aws:EC2InstanceSourcePrivateIP and aws:VpcSourceIP condition keys are the same. Deny access if the values are not the same. Apply the SCP to the OU.

Using CodePipeline + CodeConnections Git repo provides version control, automated deployment, and rollback. Each template includes AWS::ControlTower::EnableControl for OU-level guardrails. AWS Control Tower documentation recommends this GitOps automation model.

The key requirement is to prevent non-approved EC2 instance types from being created at stack creation time, specifically when developers deploy AWS CloudFormation stacks. This is a pre-deployment enforcement requirement, not a detection or remediation requirement after resources already exist.

CloudFormation Guard Hooks are purpose-built for this use case. They allow organizations to define policy-as-code rules that validate CloudFormation templates before resources are created or updated. By writing a CloudFormation Guard rule that explicitly checks the InstanceType property against an approved allow list, the stack operation will fail immediately if a developer attempts to use a disallowed instance type. This enforces compliance early in the deployment lifecycle and avoids post-deployment cleanup.

Option B uses AWS Config, which only detects noncompliance after resources are created. Even with remediation, the instance would still be launched briefly, which violates the requirement. Option C uses an SCP, which applies broadly to all EC2 launches in the organization and is not limited to CloudFormation stacks; this is overly restrictive and could unintentionally block other valid use cases. Option A incorrectly combines Lambda with Guard Hooks---Guard Hooks natively evaluate Guard rules and do not invoke Lambda functions.

Therefore, using a CloudFormation Guard rule with a Guard Hook is the correct and AWS-recommended solution for enforcing approved EC2 instance types during CloudFormation deployments.

https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/lambda-function-assume-iam-role/ https://kreuzwerker.de/post/aws-multi-account-setups-reloaded